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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
BLAKE STEVENS 
and llARTFORD INSURANCE, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
DWINN A. HENION, Mother of 
BARI LYN BLAIR, daughter of 
BARRY A. BLAIR, deceased, and 




Case No. 19006 
PETITION FOR REVIEW FROM THE 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
HONORABLE TIMOTHY C. ALLEN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This Petition is for the review of the Industrial Commis-
s1on's decision that •average weekly wages" under the Work-
men's Compensation Act includes an out-of-town subsistence 
allowance paid to an employee to cover expenses he would not 
t1ave incurred but for his employment activities. 
DISPOSITION BY THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
The Application for dependent death benefits under the 
Workmen's Compensation Act was heard by Administrative Law 
Judge Timothy C. Allen. Judge Allen awarded dependent death 
benefits based upon an average weekly wage of $5.50 per hour 
for a 35 hour work week and a $32.50 daily out-of-town sub-
sistence allowance. Plaintiffs filed a Motion to review the 
inclusion of the subsistence allowance in the average weekly 
wage. The Industrial Commission denied the Motion. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff's seek a ruling that the •average weekly wage' 
under the Workmen's Compensation Act does not include an 
out-of-town subsistence allowance paid to an employee to 
cover expenses he would not have incurred but for his employ-
ment activities. Plaintiffs request that this Court reverse 
the Industrial Commission's inclusion of this subsistence 
allowance in the decedent's average weekly wage. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant Dwinn Benion and decedent Barry A. Blair began 
living together in July, 1981. One month later they learned 
that she was pregnant. In September, 1981, they became en-
gaged and set their wedding date for March, 1982, two months 
before their child was expected. This wedding date was later 
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crr•nPrl until after the child's birth SO that Ms. Henion 
' ' ', "ain single and receive free maternal care. During 
i rr1c t 1rnc they continued to reside in Salt Lake County. (R. 
30, 31, 35, 36, 63, 65). 
While they were living together, decedent was employed by 
Stevens Construction. Until November, 1981, he worked 
in the Salt Lake Valley Area. In November, 1981, decedent 
began working on a job in Green River, Wyoming. Since this 
work was out-of-town, decedent regularly travelled to Green 
River on Monday and returned home on Friday night. While 
working in Green River decedent received a $32.50 per day 
subsistence allowance in addition to his wage of $5.50 per 
hour for a 35 hour work week. On January 14, 1982, decedent 
was electrocuted while working in Green River. In June, 
1982, decedent's posthumous child was born. (R. 29, 47, 65, 
66) • 
The Industrial Commission awarded death benefits to dece-
dent's posthumous child based upon an average weekly wage of 
$355 per week. This represents $192.50 in hourly wages and 
$162.50 in subsistence allowance. The plaintiffs challenge 
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the inclusion of the subsistence allowance in the average 
weekly wage. 1 
ARGUMENT 
The Workmen's Compensation Act provides that those who 
are wholly dependent upon a person who dies as a result of an 
industrial accident shall receive weekly death benefits of 
66-2/3% of the decedent's •average weekly wage• at the time 
of injury, but no more than 85% of the state average weekly 
wage at the time of injury. Utah Code Ann. § 35-l-68(2)(b)(i) 
(1953). The formula for computing the average weekly wage 
where wages are fixed by the hour is described in Utah Code 
Ann. § 35-l-75(l)(e) (1953): 
(1) Except as otherwise provided in this act, 
the average weekly wage of the injured employee at 
the time of the injury shall be taken as the basis 
upon which to compute the weekly compensation rate 
and shall be determined as follows: 
(e) If at the time of the injury the 
wages are fixed by the hour, the average weekly wage 
shall be determined by multiplying the hourly rate 
by the number of hours the employee would have 
worked for the week if the accident had not inter-
vened. In no case shall the hourly wage be multi-
plied by less than 20 for the purpose of determining 
the weekly wage. 
lThe inclusion of the subsistence allowance in computing 
the average weekly wage provides an additional $28,080 in 
benefits over the first six years. (The $355 average weekly 
wage qualifies for maximum weekly payments of $218, while a 
$192.50 average weekly wage qualifies for weekly payments of 
$128.) If benefits are extended under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 35-1-70 (1953) for more than twelve years, the difference 
will exceed $84,000. 
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POINT 
A ALLOWANCE PAID TO AN EMPLOYEE 
TO COVER EXPENSES HE WOULD NOT HAVE INCUR-
RED BUT FOR EMPLOYMENT ACTIVITIES ARE NOT A 
PART OF HIS AVERAGE WEEKLY WAGES UNDER THE 
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT. 
Since dependent death benefits under the Workmen's Com-
pensation Act arise by legislative enactment, whether a sub-
sistence allowance is included in the •average weekly wage" 
presents a question of statutory construction. In resolving 
this question, the legislative definition of •average weekly 
wage" must control. As set out in Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-75, 
where the wages are fixed by the hour, the average weekly 
wage "shall be determined" by multiplying the hourly rate by 
the number of hours that would have been worked during the 
week of the accident. The decedent's wages at the time of 
the accident were fixed by the hour. As a matter of law, the 
Industrial Commission should have determined that the dece-
dent's average weekly wage was $192.50, the hourly rate of 
$5.50 per hour multiplied against the 35 hour work week. 
Since the statutory formula does not include a subsistence 
allowance for out-of-town work, its inclusion in the average 
weekly wage by the Industrial Commssion was error. 
This conclusion is not only mandated by the statutory 
formula established by the legislature, but is also compelled 
by the formula's legislative history, the meaning of wages 
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and subsistence allowances, and the policy of the Workmens' 
Compensation Act. 
A. The Legislative History of § 35-1-75 Demonstrates A 
Rejection Of The Industrial Commission's Def1n1tion. 
The present § 35-1-75 was enacted in 1971. 1971 Utah 
Laws ch. 76, § 10. It was modeled after § 19 of the "Work-
men's Compensation and Rehabilitation Law" proposed by The 
Council of State Governments through its Committee on Sug-
gested State Legislation. See •workmen's Compensation and 
Rehabilitation Law (Revised)" published in July, 1974 by the 
Council of State Governments. As noted by Professor Larson, 
this section is somewhat different from the common wage-basis 
statute and is an attempt to anticipate controversies under 
the common statutes. 2 A. Larson, The Law of Workmen's Corn-
pensation (1981). § 60.ll(a), footnote 77 .. 
One of the controversies anticipated by the council was 
whether the reasonable value of board, room, rent, housing, 
lodging, fuel and similar advantages would be a part of aver-
age weekly wages. The Council proposed that •wages• means: 
[I]n addition to money payments for services ren-
dered, the reasonable value of board, rent, housing, 
lodging, fuel or similar advantage received from the 
employer, and gratuities received in the course of 
employment from others than the employer. § 2(n), 
Workmens Compensation and Rehabilitation Law. 
In enacting § 35-1-75, the Utah Legislature did not 
choose to adopt the Council's recommended definition. In-
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, , , ,,,i, our legislature made the hourly rate, in this case, 
"'ntrolling factor. The Industrial Commission's rede-
f1n1ng of "average weekly wages" to include what the legis-
lature rejected is improper. 
B. The Meaning Of Wages Is Entirely Different From That 
Of A Subsistence Allowance. 
As commonly understood, wages are "money paid or received 
for work or services, as by the hour, day or week." The 
Random House Dictionary of The English Language (1967). In 
Utah Code Ann. § 34-28-2(2), the legislature adopted a simi-
lar definition in establishing the law governing the payment 
of wages by employers: 
The word "wages" means all amounts due the employee 
for labor or services, whether the amount is fixed 
or ascertained on a time, task, piece, commission 
basis or other method of calculating such amount. 
The same definition was used by the legislature in establish-
ing wages as a preferred debt. Utah Code Ann. § 34-26-4. In 
all instances, the underlying nature of wages is monetary 
remuneration for labor or services. 
In contrast, a subsistence allowance is money paid in 
addition to wages "to cover expenses [an employee] may incur 
in performing his job." The Random House Dictionary of The 
English Language (1967). Although both wages and subsistence 
allowances are an employer's cost of doing business, the 
similarity ends there. A subsistence allownace is not re-
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muneration for labor or services but rather payment to 
employee expenses incurred because of the work. So long as 
the employee works, he receives wages. However, he only re-
ceives a subsistence allowance so long as he incurs special 
expenses because of the work. 
In this case the decedent was earning wages of $5.50 per 
hour. At his employer's direction, he began working in Green 
River, Wyoming for a time. Since commuting from his home in 
Salt Lake to Green River was impracticable, he would leave 
for Green River on r.onday and return home on Friday night. 
Because his work in Green River required him to incur lodg-
ing, meal and travel expenses he would not have otherwise 
incurred, he was paid a $32.50 daily subsistence allowance to 
cover, at least in part, these expenses. To say that this 
subsistence allowance represented remuneration for labor sub-
verts the meaning of wages. 
c. The Policy Of The Workmen's Compensation Act Pro-
hibits Inclucing A Subsistence Allowance In Average 
Weekly Wages. 
The underlying policy of the Workmen's Compensation Act 
is to assure an employee and his dependents certain compensa-
tion, medical and disability benefits for industrial acci-
dents without undue expense, delay or uncertainty. State Tax 
Commission v. Department of Finance, 576 P.2d 1297 (Utah 
1982). When an employee dies in an industrial accident, the 
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"'·,., l Jc u re has determined that his family should receive a 
, '11tage of what the employee would have been expected to 
in wages had he not died, all according to a strict 
formula. It was never intended that these benefits represent 
anything more. 
When the Industrial Commission included the subsistence 
allowance in its award, the decedent's dependent benefited by 
$28,080 over six years. Had he not died, the decedent would 
not have had this amount available for the care of his depen-
dent. Even assuming that his out-of-town work would have 
continued that long, he would have been required to spend the 
subsistence allowance on expenses incurred because of his 
employment. Thus, including the subsistence allowance in the 
average weekly wage is nothing more than a windfall. 
The windfall nature of including the subsistence allow-
ance in average weekly wages is illustrated by a hypotheti-
cal. Suppose that the decedent was still being paid $5.50 
per hour and given a $32.50 daily subsistence allowance for 
out-of-town work. Working with him was a co-employee who was 
also paid $5.50 per hour. However, since this co-employee 
lived near the worksite, he was not paid a subsistence allow-
ance. If both died in the same industrial accident, the 
co-employee's dependents would receive $28,080 less in bene-
fits, although the work and wages of both would have been the 
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same. Yet because the decedent was incurring employment 
related expenses for which he was being reimbursed and which 
would no longer be incurred, his dependent would receive a 
substantially greater benefit. 
Such a result was not the intent of the legislature. 
According to legislative policy, the hourly wage without the 
subsistence allowance represents what the decedent would have 
been expected to receive had he not died. 
POINT II 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S RATIONALE FOR 
ALLOWING DEATH BENEFITS BASED ON A SUBSIS-
TENCE ALLOWANCE IGNORES STATUTORY MANDATE, 
MISCONSTRUES THE CONCEPT OF ROOM AND BOARD 
AND THE CONCEPT OF REAL ECONOMIC 
GAIN. 
In denying the Motion for Review on the issue of the sub-
sistence allowance, the Industrial Commission offered this 
rationale: 
With regard to the inclusion of the daily subsis-
tence allowance as a part of the decedent's wage, we 
are of the opinion that the Administrative Law Judge 
made the correct decision. Professor Larsen [sic) 
in his treatise The Law of Workmen's Compensation, 
Section 60-12(a), cites with approval the inclusion 
of room and board as a portion of wages on the basis 
that it constitutes a real economic gain to the 
employee. This has long been the policy of the 
Commission and we see no reason to change it now. 
Plaintiffs submit that this rationale is deficient for 
three reasons. First, it ignores the formula mandated by 
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1-1ute. Second, it misconstrues the concept of room and 
,, ,1 And third, it misapplies the concept of real economic 
qa1n- Before addressing each of these points, it should be 
that whether "this has long been the policy of the 
Commission" is irrelevant. The statute, not the Commission's 
policy, governs. Like the Commission's long standing policy 
of regulating hospital fees which was struck down by this 
Court in Intermountain Health Care v. Industrial Commission, 
657 P.2d 1289 (Utah 1982), this policy must be struck down as 
contrary to law regardless of Commission policy. 
A. In Awarding Death Benefits Based Upon A Subsistence 
Allowance, The Industrial Commission Ignored The 
Formula Mandated By The Legislature. 
Since workmen's compensation benefits arise by legis-
lative decree, they are only so broad as the legislative 
mandate provides. Thus the proper place to begin an inquiry 
as to the scope of benefits is the language of the statute. 
As previously discussed, under § 35-1-75, wages do not in-
elude a subsistence allowance for out-of-town employment. 
Regardless what reasons the Industrial Commission may have 
for wanting to change this law, they are duty bound to fol-
low, not ignore it. 
Not only has the Industrial Commission failed to consider 
the statutory mandate, but it has also failed to recognize 
that in those states where room and board has been allowed to 
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the extent of real economic gain, the governing statutes dif 
fer from our statute. 
In Leatherbury v. Early, 32 N.E.2d 99 (Ind. Ct. App. 
1941), the Industrial Board awarded compensation based upon 
earnings which included room and board at the saw mill where 
the employee worked. In affirming this award the Court ob-
served that the governing statute defined •average weekly 
wages" as "earnings of the injured employee in the employment 
in which he was working at the time of the injury." 32 
N.E.2d at 100. The Court went on to note that the statute 
also contained the following provision for allowances: 
Wherever allowances of any character made to an 
employee in lieu of wages are specified part of the 
wage contract, they shall be deemed a part of his 
earnings. 32 N.E.2d at 100. 
Since the statute specifically included allowances in lieu of 
wages and that was the nature of the employee's room and 
board, the Court concluded that its inclusion in earnings was 
statutorily mandated. 
In Leslie v. Reynolds, 179 Kan. 422, 295 P.2d 1076 
(1956), the injured employee was a farm worker who received 
in lieu of wages a home on the farm, utilities paid, an 
automobile, and foodstuffs grown on the farm for use by the 
family. The Commissioner included the money value of these 
allowances in computing compensation. The governing statute 
provided: 
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Wt.enever in this act the term 'wages' is used it 
q," 11 be construed to mean the money rate at which 
1 ''" service rendered is recompensed under the con-
tract of hiring in force at the time of the acci-
rlFnt, and shall not include gratuities received from 
employer or others. Board and lodging when fur-
n 1 shed by the employer as part of the wages shall be 
included and valued at $5 per week unless the money 
value of such advantages shall have been otherwise 
fixed by the parties at the time of hiring. 295 
P.2d at 1081. 
Based upon this statute the Court determined that the inclu-
sion of room and board was proper to the extent of real eco-
nomic benefit. 
As these two cases illustrate, the proper inquiry is not 
what other jurisdictions do under different statutes but what 
§ 35-1-75 requires. To do otherwise is to ignore the legis-
lative mandate. 
B. Treating The Out-Of-State Subsistence Allowance As 
Room And Board Misconstrues The Concept Of Room And 
Board. 
In denying the Motion for Review, The Industrial Commis-
sion apparently relied on the following statement of Profes-
sor Larson: 
In computing actual earnings as the beginning 
point of wage-basis calculations, there should be 
included not only wages and salary but any thing of 
value received as consideration for the work, as, 
for example, tips and bonuses, and room and board, 
constituting real economic gain to the employee. 2 
A. Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation, 
§ 60.12(a). 
It should be observed that Professor Larson is not discussing 
•hP definition of "average weekly wages" but •actual earn-
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ings.• The distinction is critical since Professor Larscc' 
treatment of this question is based upon the commonest type 
of workmen's compensation statute which employs the 
of "earnings• not •average weekly wages." Professor Larson 
has properly observed that this type of statute differs from 
that employed by Utah. 2 A. Larson, The Law of Workmen's 
Compensation, § 60.11(2). In addition, Professor Larson's 
own statement distinguishes wages from room and board, the 
former not including the latter in its definition. Thus Pro-
fessor Larson's statement was not intended to cover the Utah 
statute and observes that room and board is not commonly 
understood to be wages. 
Even assuming that it were an appropriate interpretation 
of the Utah statute, it has been misconstrued by the Indus-
trial Commission. In addressing the issue of whether an 
out-of-town subsistence allowance is wages, the Industrial 
Commission uncritically equated an out-of-town subsistence 
allowance with room and board. Such a conclusion is unwar-
ranted. 
In footnote 6 to the above-quoted statement, Professor 
Larson cites various cases for the proposition that room and 
board represents actual earnings. A review of those cases 
demonstrates that Professor Larson is referring to the pro-
vision of room and board in lieu of wages, much like the 
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1 ""'ion statute in Leatherbury, supra. For example, in 
, t, v. Industrial Commission, 151 Colo. 538, 379 P.2d 384 
, , ,,, l), the value of 1 i ving quarters provided to a motel 
mandger was given in lieu of wages. In Bruno v. 414 w. 23d 
12 A.D. 831, 209 N.Y.S.2d 620 (1961), a building 
superintendent's rent free apartment was given in lieu of 
wages and therefore a part of the compensation award. And in 
Hall v. Joiner, 324 So.2d 884 (La. App. 1975), an apartment 
manager received a rent free apartment in lieu of wages which 
was properly categorized as earnings. 
Unlike the cases cited by Professor Larson, the decedent 
here received his regular wage while working in Green River. 
The out-of-town subsistence allowance was not given to cover 
expenses unrelated to employment but rather expenses that 
would not have been incurred but for the out-of-town employ-
ment. They were not given in lieu of wages. To say that 
they were misconstrues the statement of Professor Larson. 
C. Including the Out-of-Town Subsistence Allowance as 
Average Weekly Wages Misapplies the Concept of Real 
Economic Gain. 
Again considering the statement of Professor Larson upon 
which the Industrial Commission apparently relied and as-
suming that an out-of-town subsistence allowance can be 
equated to room and board, it still cannot be included in 
average weekly weages since it fails to "constitute real 
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economic gain to the employee." This point is illustrated 1 
reviewing several representative cases where it was held thac 
a subsistence allowance was not real economic gain to an 
employee. 
In Layne Atlantic Company v. Scott, 415 So.2d 837 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1982), the employee received allowances for 
out-of-town expenses. The statutory definition of wages 
included "the reasonable value of board, rent, housing, lodg-
ing or similar advantage received from the employer.• The 
Court held that such advantages could only be included to the 
extent of real economic gain. The Court went on to observe 
that the out-of-town expenses ended with employment and con-
eluded: 
In short, we cannot construe the term "wages" 
to include a make-whole reimbursement for uniquely 
work-related expenses that are created by and within 
the employment. 415 So.2d at 839. 
On this basis the Court reversed the deputy commissioner and 
remanded for a redetermination of wages without the out-of-
town expense allowance. 
In Moorehead v. Industrial Commission, 17 Ariz. App. 96, 
495 P.2d 866 (1972), the employee received a travel allowance 
for out-of-town work. The Industrial Commission refused to 
include this allowance in the compensation award which actioc 
was affirmed. In finding no real economic gain to the em-
ployee the Court stated: 
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"IW]ages" do not include amounts paid to the employe 
reimburse him for employment-related expenditures 
r a nature which would not be incurred but for his 
'"'f loyment. Such payments are simply not intended 
as compensation for services rendered. 495 P.2d at 
869. 
And in Solheim v. Hastings Housing Co., 151 Neb. 264, 37 
N.W.2d 212 (1949), the employee was required to work out-of-
town, leaving on Monday and returning home on Saturday. In 
addition to his salary, he received a subsistence allowance 
which the lower court had included in his compensation bene-
fits. Although the governing statute specifically included 
room and board in its definition of wages, the Court reversed 
on the ground that the allowance was intended to cover em-
ployment incurred expenses not to compensate the employee. 
Thus, the Court concluded there was no real economic gain to 
the employee. 
As illustrated by these cases, even where a statute de-
fines wages as including allowances, a subsistence allowance 
is not included since it is not a real economic gain to the 
employee. To include it in the award of compensation here 
without such a statute not only goes beyond the statute, but 
also misapplies the concept of real economic gain. 
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CONCLUSION 
The award of the subsistence allowance as a part of the 
dependent death benefits by the Industrial Commission should 
be reversed for the following reasons: 
1. Its inclusion is contrary to the statutory defini-
tion of average weekly wages as demonstrated by the statute's 
language, history, concept and policy. 
2. It does not represent wages or real economic gain to 
the employee. 
DATED this 21st day of April, 1983. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
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